The above story is about how Belgium is considering to ban the wearing of certain pieces of Islamic dress, saying that faces need to be shown.  Niqabs and burqas are being considered as items to ban.  Proponents suggest this will improve safety, while opponents say this is ridiculous as Islam requires these to be worn.  Interesting because we have read many times about humanitarian intervention and when it is acceptable.  While most of the authors we have read so far like Coady, would not consider this ban (if it were to pass) worthy of going to war, what would it do to the Islam people who are so devoted to religion?  There lives would be considerably hindered if they were forced to disrespect there religion because of a nation’s laws.  Is this an instance where other forms of pressure such as economic sanctions should be used, if Belgium is to pass this law?

This video is about a high school senior who was not allowed to take her brother as an escort to prom.  He was over 21, which is against school policy.  However, it is her brother, who also happened to be back from Iraq.  Many of the viewers comments believe it is ridiculous to not let him come to the school prom.  This is interesting because all semester we have talked about right and wrong, and perspective.  While in this instance it may seem right to let him take his sister, the principal rejected it because of the precedent it may set.  While not a typical moral decision, this brings up the question of how do we judge right or wrong?  According the school rules, it is wrong to let this older brother take his daughter.  WE are taught to obey school policies.  It’s obvious though, that people feel otherwise in this case.

This is an article on cnn about how famous quarterback for the former Super Bowl Champion Pittsburgh Steelers, Ben Roethlisberger, has been suspended 6 games by the NFL.  Recently, he was accused of sexually assaulting a teen in Georgia at a bar.  However, no charges were filed.  The NFL suspended him because he contributed to the consumption of alcohol for underage people.  While this was the right call by many, it is interesting to note what the prosecutor for Georgia said.  He said they don’t “prosecute morals, we prosecute crimes”.  This is similar to how we discussed how morals are formed, through reason or intuition.  While many consider Roethlisberger guilty in some fashion (he was also accused of sexual assault near his home), the law takes emotion out of thinking.  The law uses reasons and facts, and does not choose to prosecute based of emotions.  Also interesting to note is how in our justice system, you must be proven guilty, not proven innocent.  What is worse, letting some guilty people walk free because there is not enough evidence? (like our justice system now) or sentencing innocent people? (what it could be if our laws were innocent till proven guilty)

This is an interesting AP article I found about an Army veteran who suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder. Retired since 2005, he recently discovered that the Army was attempting to remove his medical benefits. Since then, he has been fighting for the rights of PTSD victims seeking Army benefits. This begs the question, does the military (or possibly even the government) have a positive obligation to provide medical benefits such as medication and therapy to veterans who suffer from PTSD?

http://www.kiva.org/about

The argument of whether moral principles can be applied to a wide spread scale is one which philosophers have questioned for quite some time. In the article “International Relations as a state of Nature” by Beitz provides us with many of examples of why people do not believe moral principles can be spread internationally.  Beitz uses the most popular of these Realist arguments, the Hobbesian view to create his argument that it is in fact better for states to decide to cooperate with one another, not only because it helps boost moral institutions, but also because it is in the states better interests.

Realism is the idea that creating general guiding, or normative principles for international political theory is not only impossible, but should not be done. Many realists feel that if someone were to create normative principles with the intentions of supplying “reasons for and against particular choices” these principles would be detrimental to the world of international theory (13).

One of the best-developed realist arguments is the Hobbesian idea that creating international principles is not possible because international relations follow a state of nature. In this state of nature, all states are self-interested, putting their interests before any other states, and since it is understood that all states will act similarly, there is no incentive for them to act in a way that is not in their favor. Consistency of self-interest amongst all states is almost guaranteed due to the fact that there is no international authority that can ensure that states will behave otherwise. In fact, it seems to be the general thought that “if other men will not lay down their right of nature, then there is no reason for any one, to divest himself of his: for that were to expose himself to prey” (51). Most states appear to have the fear that if they were to take the first step, they would simply be taken advantage of, and therefore would rather continue their self-interested habits.

Hobbes makes the argument that in order to justify a state’s compliance with moral rules, those rules “must appeal to those interests states hold in common” otherwise there would be no reason to comply (35). However, Beitz says this idea may not in fact “give a correct account of justification of moral principles for the international realm” (35). Beitz states that this is most true due to the interdependence that has developed between nations, and how it has become a large part of today’s world, more so then ever before. It is due to these interconnections amongst nations that it is within states best interests to cooperate with one another in order to meet “domestic economic goals” (43).

In order to ensure that states are reaching their full economic capacity, they should cooperate with other nations in order to ensure they are taking full advantage of all opportunities to develop their interests. Through cooperation with one another, even when states immediate interests are not met, states will thus promote morally acceptable institutions which will in turn continue to benefit the cooperating states.

By justifying the idea that moral cooperation will help promote the interests of all states, Beitz removes the main justifications for skepticism against normative principles. In fact, since he seems to show how cooperation in international affairs will in fact benefit states, he proves that these normative principles would be in the best interest of states in order to ensure widespread cooperation.

Follesdal cites the Bangkok Declaration, which dismisses human rights interventionism as an imperialistic Western ideology that opposes “Asian values”. The Declaration presents nine arguments against human rights. Human rights, according to the document, ignore the ties of a citizen of a country to their family, community, and government. The most compelling argument presented in the Bangkok Declaration (which many of the other arguments could fall under) is the idea that “Human rights violate respect for individuals’ tacit consent”. This, in essence, means that since individuals naturally accept the society that they live in, outsiders may not interfere with that society.

I will present an argument for human rights by first proving that there is at least some standard of universal moral code and then showing that tacit consent of individuals to their cultural environment is conditional.

The first premise is based on the idea of rational agency. As humans, we are all members of the same species. We all have the same physiology regardless of outer appearance. This means that at least at conception, assuming no psychological ailments, we all have the same potential for a rational thought process, regardless of the culture we are born into. Rational agency, therefore, is universal. Furthermore, a rational agent would not accept harm (which is innately undesirable) from an external source unless they could justify it internally. Since the act of one human harming another is a moral issue, rational agency has at least one moral implication – that unjustifiable harm between two humans is wrong.

A cultural relativist would reply by saying that consent is also a universal element of rational agency, and that consent between an individual and their society cannot be interfered with by a person or group outside of that society. This brings me to the second premise of my argument: rational agents do not automatically consent to their environment. Consent implies choice. Small children and the physically disabled are two examples of rational agents that do not have the immediate ability to act on their emotions. Furthermore, there have been instances of the aforementioned “unjustifiable harm” in the past, which leads to the conclusion that there is not always a choice. Consent, therefore, is conditional. If tacit consent between people and their governments is not universal, but there exists a degree of universal moral code, national sovereignty is not applicable in the realm of universal human rights. So while there may be differences in the moral codes of two cultures, international intervention for the sake of universal human rights is legitimate.

Cultural relativism, in the context of international affairs, is the idea that different cultures have not simply different traditions and particularities compared to one another, but inherently different values as well. From this, cultural relativists may draw the conclusion that there is no single set of laws that could possibly apply to every nation because there is no guarantee that each nation even supports the values being promoted by the law[s]. Therefore, even laws regarding human rights requirements are subject to dismissal on the grounds that they do not support the values held by the people of a given society.

The Bangkok Declaration presents nine challenges to human rights that use cultural relativism as justification. Challenge #5 of the Bangkok Declaration states:

Human rights violate respect for individuals’ tacit consent

Respect for individuals does not require respect for their “human rights,” but instead, requires that foreigners do not interfere with the society which individuals accept. The tacit consent of individuals should be respected, even when their government fails to respect human rights. (Follesdal 2005)

This rule addresses cultural relativism through the notion that, for Asian states, respect for citizens’ tacit consent is more important than respect for their human rights. Therefore a human rights system enabling outside nations to intervene in the affairs of an Asian country would be wrong because it would disregard the citizens’ tacit consent.

In response to this rule, Follesdal challenges the importance of tacit consent when pitted against human rights violations. It should not be assumed that the tacit consent of a population indicates a just government. Since “tacit consent” is, put simply, the assumption that citizens are content with their lives if they are following the laws of their government and not complaining, we should take note of cases where “silence can easily be due to fear” (Follesdal 2005). In a tyrannical government, for instance, it would be much safer for citizens to submit to the regime than revolt even if the government is corrupt. In a situation like this, it would be wrong to interpret their tacit consent as indicative of a just government. Therefore, compared to respect for human rights, respect for tacit consent should be limited.

Unlike Follesdal’s responses to most of the nine challenges of the Bangkok Declaration, his response to challenge #5 does not involve a rebuttal of cultural relativism. While this may at first appear to be a weak point in his argument, I found his response to the fifth challenge to be one of the most convincing of the nine primarily because of this. Rather than searching for evidence that Eastern philosophy shares many human rights values with our own, he aimed his argument at the underlying principles of tacit consent as a whole. By doing this, it become irrelevant whether tacit consent is more of an eastern value than western. To me, Follesdal’s attack on the core idea of tacit consent made the biggest contribution to his argument against the Bangkok Declaration.

“Human Rights and Relativism.” Real World Justice: Grounds, Principles, Human Rights Standards and Institutions. Andreas Follesdal and Thomas Pogge, editors. Berlin: Springer, 265-83

“The best way to ameliorate Third World poverty is by massively increasing migration to the West. Left to their own devices many people would gravitate to life-sustaining resources, leading to a rough equilibrium between the world’s resources and its population.”

Another really pertinent article discussing topics relate to Risse’s “On the Morality of Immigration.”  A continuous and fascinating debate, this article from Australia shows that this is a problem not only face by the United States, but by countries across the globe.  The author offers the radical viewpoint that mass migration of peoples from the third world to the first world would end global poverty – is this really true?

Interesting post related to the Singer/Kuper debate on solutions to world poverty.  Kuper argues for alleviating poverty through economic support of the country, and sites the use of microfinance and microloans as a way to help.  This article talks about microfinance companies in places like India, but focuses on the fact that some companies are switching to a for-profit model rather than purely not-for-profit philosophy.  Is it okay to profit from poverty, while claiming to help?